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Abstract
Previous research has suggested that false memories can prime performance on related implicit
and explicit memory tasks.  The present research examined whether false memories can also be
used to prime higher order cognitive processes, namely, insight-based problem solving.
Participants were asked to solve a number of compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems,
half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) lists
whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem.  The results showed that when the critical
lure (a) was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than
problems that were not primed by a DRM list and (b) was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem
solution rates and times were no different than when there was no DRM priming.  A second
experiment demonstrated that these outcomes were not a simple artifact of the inclusion of a recall
test prior to the problem-solving task.  The implications of these results are discussed with regard
to the previous literature on priming and the adaptive function of false memories.
Keywords: False memory; Problem solving; Adaptive memory
Can False Memories Prime Problem Solutions?
            Research has established that memory is error-prone and that these errors frequently lead
to false memory illusions (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  Such errors of
commission can be studied using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm where
participants are given word lists (e.g., truck, bus, train, vehicle) whose members are all associates
of an unpresented item or critical lure (e.g., car).  Despite never having been presented,
participants often falsely remember the critical lure as being presented in the list.
            There is considerable evidence showing that true and false memories most often behave in
very different ways (for reviews, see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Gallo, 2006).  Although
these differences are many, including differences in patterns of neural activation for true and false
memories (e.g., Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Donohue, Goodman, & Bunge, 2008; Wiese & Donahue,
2006), there is a growing literature that also shows some similarities, at least at the behavioral
level.  Indeed, recent research has found that in a number of important ways false memories
behave in a manner very similar to that of true memories.  For example, Roediger and McDermott
(1995) showed that not only do participants report a high level of confidence in their recognition
of critical lures they also claim to have specifically “remembered” the act of studying such items.
Indeed, Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that participants were just as likely to give
remember responses for false memories as they are for true memories.  Research by Payne,
Lampinen, and Cordero (1996) has also suggested that false memories show similarities to true
memories, providing evidence that both true and false recall decrease under divided attention
conditions.
            Based on findings such as these, it might be expected that false memories exhibit other
parallels with true memories.  One avenue that has recently been explored concerns whether false
memories can prime implicit tests of memory in the same way that true memories can.  If one
accepts that false memories are caused by a spreading activation mechanism (see Howe, Wimmer,
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Roediger & McDermott, 1995), then priming becomes an ideal area
of investigation (Anderson, 1983).  In true memory, priming can be understood as an enhanced
speed and tendency to complete tasks, such as stem completion tasks, when their completion
involves the use of a word previously studied (e.g. Graf, Shimamura, & Squire, 1985).
McDermott (1997) examined whether the critical lures produced by the DRM paradigm could be
used to prime word-stem and fragment-completion tasks in the same way.  She found that
although priming occurred at a level lower than if the items had actually been studied, priming of
the critical lures did occur on both the stem- and fragment-completion tasks.  Finally, research by
McKone and Murphy (2000) managed to successfully prime critical lures on both implicit (stem-
completion) and explicit (stem-cued recall) memory tasks.
            A logical next step, and one which the present article is concerned with, is to investigate
whether false memories can be used to prime more complex cognitive tasks, such as insight-based
problem solving.  Insight-based problem solving can be defined as the moment when a solver
gains clear and sudden understanding of how to solve a problem (Bowden, Jung-Beeman, Fleck,
& Kounios, 2005).  Problems requiring a high level of insight may be aided by the spreading
activation of concepts in memory, a process similar to the mechanisms proposed in spreading
activation models of false memory effects (e.g., Associative-activation theory, or AAT, Howe et
al., 2009; Activation-monitoring theory, or AMT, Roediger & McDermott, 1995).  For example,
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) found that insight problem solving initially involves searching
through related concepts in memory for relevant information.  Bowden et al. (2005) have also
suggested that insight related problem solving initially involves the activation of concepts in
memory that are unrelated to the solution, followed by the weak activation of concepts that are
critical to the solution.  Research has already suggested that true memories can be used to prime
problem solving and reasoning tasks successfully (e.g., Kokinov, 1990).  The present research is
concerned with whether false memories can be used in the same manner.
            One particular insight problem that has received much interest is the Compound Remote
Associate Task (CRAT).  Originally developed by Mednick (1962), these tasks involve the
presentation of three words, for example, apple, family, house, all of which can be linked by the
use of one word, in this case tree.  In order to gain insight and solve this problem, theorists have
suggested a process involving spreading activation, one that continues until the correct concept
has been activated (e.g., Bowden et al., 2005).  The possibility that false recall of a critical lure
(one which is the same as the linking word in the CRAT) could prime, and therefore aid, the
solution of these problems will be explored in the current experiment.  To do this, we asked
participants to solve CRAT problems, half of which had their solution primed by the prior
presentation of a DRM list whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem, and half of
which had not been primed.  It was predicted that when participants are primed using DRM lists
whose critical lure is also the solution to a subsequently presented CRAT problems, such




            Forty-two students, aged between 21 and 42 (M = 24.6 years, SD = 5.4 years), participated
in the experiment.  All participants provided written informed consent prior to the study and were
fully debriefed about the purpose of the study upon completion.
Design, Materials, and Procedure
            A within-participant design was used where each participant was primed on half of the
CRAT problems with a preceding DRM list whose critical lure was also the solution to one of the
CRAT problems.  Following study-test trials on four DRM lists, participants attempted to solve all
eight CRAT problems.  Each participant was randomly assigned four DRM lists, and both the
order of the DRM lists and CRAT problems were carefully counterbalanced to eliminate order
effects.
            Eight CRAT problems were selected from the normative data produced by Bowden and
Jung-Beeman (2003).  Each CRAT consisted of three words, all of which could be solved by a
single linking word.  Eight DRM lists were used, consisting of 15 associates of the critical lure.
Lists were selected because their critical lure was the same as the solution word used in the
selected CRAT problem.  DRM lists were taken from the normed associates created by Nelson,
McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998) and were randomly divided into two groups of four.  Participants
were primed on half the DRM lists first and then completed all eight CRAT problems.  The two
sets of four DRM lists were equated on backward associative strength (BAS) List set 1 BAS =
.189; List set 2 BAS = .186).
            Participants were given four out of the eight DRM lists in a randomized order.  Each list
was presented verbally, followed by a distractor task (counting backwards by threes for 30
seconds), and were then asked to verbally recall as many words as they could remember from the
list.  Once this had been repeated for each of the four lists, participants completed all eight CRAT
problems.  Participants were first given an example, followed by two practice CRAT problems
before they began.  Each CRAT was presented on a computer screen, in random order, and
participants were asked to provide a verbal solution.  If participants failed to correctly solve a
CRAT, they were given feedback as to the correct answer after each problem.  Solution times
were measured from the problem onset to the time the participant gave their response, with
participants having a maximum of one minute to complete the problem before they were
considered to have failed to solve the problem.
Results and Discussion
            False memory rates were comparable to other studies using recall measures (e.g., Howe et
al., 2009) with participants falsely recalling the critical lure an average of 56% of the time.  The
mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) were
calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of analyses of variance
(ANOVAs).  For primed CRAT problems, solution rates and solution times were further
conditionalized on whether the participant had produced the critical lure during recall (i.e.,
primed/FM = critical lure produced and primed/No-FM = no critical lure produced).  Thus, both
solution rates and solution times were subjected to separate ANOVAs where the only factor was
solution type (unprimed vs. primed/No-FM vs. primed/FM).
Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for solution type, F(2, 82) = 4.09, p =
.02, (2p = .09, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s LSD) showed that solution rates were highest for
primed/FM problems (M = .65) than primed/No-FM (M = .45; p < .02) and unprimed (M = .48;
p < .02) problems, and the latter two did not differ.  Concerning solution times, there was also a
main effect for solution type, F(2, 82) = 7.51, p = .001, (2p = .16, where post-hoc tests (Tukey’s
LSD) showed that solution times were fastest for primed/FM problems (M = 31.14) than
primed/No-FM (M = 45.15; p < .002) and unprimed (M = 43.74; p < .006) problems, and the latter
two did not differ.
The findings from this study are the first to demonstrate that false memories can prime
insight-based problem solving.  It was clear that when problem solutions were primed by the prior
presentation of DRM lists whose critical lures were the solution to that problem, both the
probability of, and speed with which, such problems were solved improved significantly.  Key to
this finding is that it is not simply the priming of the problem solution given the presentation of a
DRM list whose critical lure is the problem solution, but rather, the participant must also falsely
remember that item as one having been presented in the list.  That is, the false memory must, for
all intents and purposes, become part of the “presented” list and be recalled along with the items
that were actually presented.
It could be argued that the very act of falsely remembering the critical lure changes this
item from a false memory into something analogous to a memory for something that was actually
presented.  That is, recalling a false memory makes it now something that was actually
remembered, in effect, rendering it no different from a true memory.  However, we argue that
there is a fundamental difference between remembering an item that was actually presented (a true
memory) and one that was not presented (a false memory).  Specifically, unlike a true memory
that was consciously encoded from its physical presentation at study, a false memory is generated
at encoding (see Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009) not from its physical presentation but
rather from the internal spread of activation in associative memory that occurs automatically
outside of conscious awareness.  Thus, priming occurred with information that was not physically
presented but was generated internally and automatically without conscious awareness.
Moreover, this is distinct from priming that can occur in other forms of associative memory
testing.  For example, priming in word association tests, like true memories, involves the
generation of the prime in an intentional, consciously effortful manner as when a cue is presented
(e.g., cat) and the person is asked to generate related words (e.g., dog).
Therefore, we argue that the current findings are both important and unique in at least
three senses.  First, they extend the domain of false memory priming to higher cognitive (problem
solving) processes.  Second, they show that priming of problem solutions can and does occur even
when the prime is generated automatically in the absence of conscious awareness and the presence
of a physical stimulus (i.e., a false memory).  Third, they have uncovered a hitherto unreported
precondition for the effectiveness of false memories as primes (at least for problem solving tasks),
namely, that false memories must become sufficiently activated that they become part of the
output sequence on memory tests.
However, before we can safely conclude that these are priming effects that rely on false
memory activation, we must somehow determine that the observed effects are not simply due to
activation of the critical lure during preceding memory test.  That is, we need to also establish that
priming effects occur in the absence of a prior test of recall.1 Remember that the importance of the
current result lies in the fact that it is not just having seen a list of related items prior to the
problem solving task that increases the rate and speed with which these problems are solved, but
rather, that these effects only occur when the critical lure, which is also the solution to the CRAT,
is falsely remembered on the recall test.  Because problem solving is only enhanced under these
conditions, the recall test is effectively confounded with changes in the probability of solving a
particular problem and the speed with which it is solved using the current paradigm.  In order to
demonstrate that these effects are due to priming from the activation of the critical lure (e.g.,
during list encoding) and not simply activation during the recall tasks itself, we need to find a way
to dissociate these effects.  We resolve this problem in our second experiment.
Experiment 2
            In order to resolve the problems associated with this confound, there are at least three
additional issues that need to be addressed.  First, it should be pointed out that there is a growing
consensus that false memories are generated during the encoding phase of the DRM task and not
during retrieval (see Dewhurst et al., 2009).  What this means is that the likelihood that the critical
lure itself was generated during recall is very low.  Thus, although just the act of recalling an item
during a memory test may enhance its activation at that time, a confound that still needs to be
addressed, we would argue that the main priming effect came from the generation of the critical
lure during encoding.
            Second, because Experiment 1 demonstrated that it is not simply the presentation of a list
prior to problem solving that is important, but rather that we require additional evidence that the
false memory was in fact generated, means that we need some sort of memory measure by which
to conditionalize problem solving success.  Switching from an intervening recall test to a
recognition test will not do and may actually worsen the problem.  This is because such tests
involve physically presenting the critical lure as part of the recognition test, amounting to having
presented the solution to the CRAT prior to presenting the problem itself.  If the likelihood of the
CRAT solution is then increased, we do not know whether this advantage is due to the critical lure
being generated during encoding, the critical lure having just been presented on a recognition test,
or both.  For this reason, we opted to use a recall test in Experiment 1.
            Third, instead of interposing the memory test between list presentation and the
administration of the problem solving task, we could have opted to have the list presentation
followed by problem solving followed by the memory test (recall or recognition).  The problem
here is that performance on the memory test (i.e., false recall or recognition of the critical lures in
question) is now confounded with two prior tasks, list learning and problem solving.  Thus, any
increase in the likelihood of participants’ producing the critical lure on this later memory test
could be due to generation of the critical lure during list encoding, generation of the critical lure as
the solution to the CRAT during problem solving, or both.  For this reason, we opted to administer
the recall test after list encoding but prior to problem solving in Experiment 1.
            In a sense, then, the methodology used in Experiment 1 is the least confounded one
available given the options just outlined.  However, the fact remains that falsely recalling the
critical lure on the memory test does potentially increase its activation level and may contribute to
the findings we obtained in the first experiment.  In order to avoid this inevitable confound, we
conducted an experiment without the intervening memory test.  That is, participants were
presented DRM lists and then solved problems without administering an intervening memory test.
 Although this procedure does not allow us to discriminate problems that were solved given false
recollection of the critical lure versus when the critical lure had not been generated, it does
remove the memory test confound.  Given prior evidence that participants are likely to generate a
sufficient number of false memories during encoding, despite the absence of a memory test that
measures false memory production in this experiment, we predicted that the primed CRATs
should be solved at a higher rate and more quickly on average than those CRATs that were not
primed.  Thus, although the current experiment removes the possibility that priming was an
artifact of a preceding memory test, it does not permit the same analytical precision as the first
experiment.  That is, it does not allow us to separate primed problems in which the false memory
was recalled from primed problems where the false memory was not recalled, a critical feature of




            A new sample of 11 students, aged between 18 and 34 (M = 19.8 years, SD = 4.7 years),
participated in the experiment.  All participants provided written informed consent prior to the
study and were fully debriefed about the purpose of the study upon completion.
Design, Materials, and Procedure
            The same basic design, materials, and procedure were employed here as in Experiment 1.
Again, a within-participant design was used where each participant was primed on half of the
CRAT problems with a preceding DRM list whose critical lure was also the solution to one of the
CRAT problems.  No memory tests were administered so participants first studied a list that was
presented verbally and were then given the distractor task (counting backwards by threes for 30
seconds). Once this had been repeated for each of the four lists, participants completed all eight
CRAT problems in the same manner as before.
Results and Discussion
            Because no memory test was administered, we cannot assess false memory rates.  The
mean CRAT solution rates (proportions) and the mean CRAT solution times (seconds) were
calculated for each participant and analyzed separately in a series of analyses of variance
(ANOVAs).  Again because there was no memory test, the analyses focused solely on primed (list
presented) versus unprimed (no list presented) CRAT solution rates and solution times.
Concerning solution rates, there was a main effect for solution type, F(1, 10) = 6.88, p =
.026, (2p = .407, where solution rates were higher for primed problems (M = .53, SD = .16) than
for unprimed problems (M = .39, SD = .20)2.  Concerning solution times, there was also a main
effect for solution type, F(1, 10) = 9.51, p = .012, (2p = .487, where solution times were faster for
primed problems (M = 40.00, SD = 7.36) than for unprimed problems (M = 52.18, SD = 8.82).
            Thus, even in the absence of an intervening recall test, participants performed better on
CRATs that were primed by the presentation of a prior DRM list whose critical lure was also the
solution to that problem performed better (i.e. solution rates and times were enhanced) than those
that were unprimed.  It would seem that the intervening recall test in Experiment 1 was not the
primary source of the problem solving advantage observed in that experiment.  Rather, these
problem-solving advantages were more likely due to participants having generated the critical lure
during list encoding and that it was this false memory generation that was the source of these
priming effects.
General Discussion
Together, the results of these experiments clearly demonstrate for the first time that false
memories can prime insight-based problem solving (Experiment 1) and that these priming effects
are not simply due to the administration of a recall test prior to the problem-solving task
(Experiment 2).  Moreover, it was clear that when problem solutions were primed by the prior
presentation of DRM lists whose critical lures were the solution to that problem, both the
probability of, and speed with which, such problems were solved improved significantly.
Importantly, it is not simply the priming of the problem solution given the presentation of a DRM
list whose critical lure is the problem solution, but rather, the participant must also falsely
remember that item as one having been presented in the list.
These results strongly suggest that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating
problem solving.  Specifically, DRM lists can prime and facilitate performance on problem-
solving tasks both in terms of the rate at which problems are solved as well as the speed with
which they are solved.  However, this conclusion is restricted to cases in which the critical lure is
falsely recalled (Experiment 1).  Such facilitation is not found when the false critical lure has not
been recalled.  Indeed, priming with no recall of the critical lure resulted in problem-solving rates
and times identical to conditions in which there was no priming.
These results are similar to findings showing critical lures can prime performance on
related tests of implicit and explicit memory (e.g., McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000).
The importance of the present research is that it extends the domain of false memory priming
effects to more than changes in performance on related memory tasks.  That is, false memories
can prime performance on more complex problem solving tasks, in particular, insight problems.
Moreover, the current research clearly demonstrates that these effects occur only when the critical
lure is also falsely remembered on a memory test.  That is, priming does not occur simply as a
function of list presentation, but rather, is restricted to those instances in which false memories are
also recollected.  This theoretical constraint is important because it suggests that the ability of
false memories to prime insight-based problem solving is limited to circumstances where false
memories achieve activation levels that are sufficient enough to produce recall3.
            These results are not only interesting in and of themselves but also have a number of
important implications.  First, as argued earlier, these results add to the growing literature
suggesting that false memories can exhibit effects similar to that of true memories.  Second, the
results add to an emerging consensus that false memories have beneficial effects in human
cognition and emotion and not simply the negative consequences we are all familiar with in the
forensic (e.g., eyewitness memory) literature.  For example, McKay and Dennett (2009) have
argued that ungrounded or false beliefs are adaptive, a conclusion that has implications for false
(or ungrounded) memories.  For example, the positivity bias in autobiographical memory, a
tendency to accentuate the positive aspects of personal experiences when (inaccurately or falsely)
remembering the past, has been linked to enhanced emotional regulation (Mather & Cartensen,
2005).  That this positivity bias drives false recollection and not just selective remembering, has
been amply shown in recent work by Fernandes, Ross, Wiegand, and Schryer (2008).  Regulating
emotion through falsely remembering a more positive past has been interpreted as being an
extremely adaptive function of memory, or more accurately, of false remembering (also see
Newman & Lindsay, 2009).  This is because such recollections can directly benefit not only one’s
current self-image, but also influence one’s future behaviors, motivations, and social relationships
(see Wilson, Gunn, & Ross, 2009).  That is, a more positive self-evaluation may serve a very
healthy function inasmuch as it can lead to nurturing new and maintaining existing social
relationships, maintaining and extending empathy, and securing intimacy in relationships with
others (see Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Cuc, Koppel, & Hirst, 2007).
Recently, Howe and Derbish (2010) have found that survival-related items and survival-
related processing increased both true and false memory production.  Given the evolutionary
value of survival information, an increase in errors and false memories for this information may
seem maladaptive.  However, Howe and Derbish (2010) have suggested that the priming of
strongly interconnected survival-related concepts in memory, whether actually present or simply
activated by what has been presented, may be adaptive because it may guide attention to other
survival relevant materials in the environment.  For example, misremembering the presence of a
predator at a watering hole when only signs of its existence were present (e.g., feces, paw prints)
will make one more cautious upon return to that watering hole than an animal that correctly
remembers there was no predator.  Moreover, upon approaching the watering hole the animal with
the false memory may make different decisions than the animal that remembers accurately, for
example, by going to the watering hole at a different time, approaching it from a more secluded
route, selecting a route where escape (e.g., into the trees) is easier, and so forth.  Indeed, the
ability to solve problems in a survival-related context is a crucial evolutionary trait (Leach &
Ansell, 2008).  An increase in false memories for survival information may not necessarily be
maladaptive if they can prime and aid the solution of complex problems in a manner similar to
true memories.  As Howe and Derbish (2010) pointed out, that the byproduct of memory
activation can be a false recollection may be a small price to pay if such false memories, like true
memories, can aid the solution of more complex, survival-relevant problems.
The point is simply that false memories can contribute to changes in problem solving just
as false beliefs can affect decision making (McKay & Dennett, 2009).  These conclusions are
consistent with the findings here.  Indeed, we have shown that (1) priming can occur with
information that has not been physically presented but that has been internally generated in an
incidental and automatic manner outside of conscious awareness, (2) such priming effects can and
do facilitate processing times and solution rates on tasks other than those related to implicit or
explicit memory, namely, insight-based problems, and (3) these effects occur regardless of
whether there is an intervening test trial but that when tests are present, priming only occurs when
participants falsely believe (recall) that the critical lure was present on the list.  This is a very clear
demonstration that false memories, like ungrounded beliefs, can have a positive impact on
cognition, one that contrasts with the more usual experimental, forensic, and clinical literatures
that have focused primarily on the negative effects of false memories.  The current research has
taken us a step closer to realizing the positive aspects of false recollection and has clearly
established that false memories can and do provide significant benefits when it comes to more
complex cognitive processes, specifically insight-based problem solving.
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Footnotes
1We thank two anonymous reviewers for this suggestion.
2At first glance, it appears that the baseline problem-solving rates differed across these two
experiments, with average rates being higher in the first experiment that involved testing memory
than in the second experiment where there was no memory test.  However, statistical analyses
showed that such differences were not reliable for either the primed or unprimed problems.  For
primed problems, the mean solution rate for Experiment 2 was .53, a figure that compares
favorably to the average solution rate of .55 found in Experiment 1 (this latter rate reflects the
average solution rate for primed problems in Experiment 1 regardless of whether priming did or
did not result in false recall).  For unprimed problems, the mean solution rate for Experiment 2
was lower (.39) than that for Experiment 1 (.48), but this difference was not statistically
significant (t[51] = 1.874, n.s.).  Although such differences may be of interest should they recur in
future research, we attribute these modest and statistically insignificant differences in the current
study to sampling error.
3Is there any other way around the use of an intervening memory test that would given us the
same information about false memory generation but without the added activation at test?  One
interesting suggestion is that instead of using a memory test we use variation in BAS as a proxy
for the probability that a false memory would be generated during encoding (more likely with
high BAS lists) and assess CRAT performance for high versus low BAS items (we thank another
anonymous reviewer for this suggestion).  When we calculated the correlations between BAS
(which varied between .10 and .52 in our experiments) and subsequent problem solving success,
none of the correlations were significant (r = .35 for solution rates and r = -.42 for solution times,
two-tailed tests, N = 8).  Although a larger sample and greater variation in BAS may produce
significant relationships between BAS and problem solving, given the extent to which individual
differences exist in false memory generation even with high BAS lists (e.g., Unsworth & Brewer,
2010), we are not confident that BAS provides as accurate a measure of false memory generation
and activation as that obtained when using an intervening memory test.
